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a dictator. i would never back a dictator. >> good morning. i'm suzanne maloney, vice president and director of a foreign policy at the brookings institution. thank you so much for joining us for this important and timely discussion about the implications of the deterioration of relations between the united states and russia for arms control and a nuclear security. in the speech last week marking the first anniversary of its brutal invasion of ukraine, russian president vladimir putin announced that moscow would've suspended its participation in the new start treaty, after the demise of landmark agreements such as the anti-boasting missile and intermediate range nuclear forces treaties, new start is the last remaining nuclear arms control agreement between washington and moscow. putin claimed his move reduces the prospect for a following agreement to replace new start

when it expires in february 2026, a prospect was already substantially diminished as a result of the war in ukraine. russia's decision has drawn widespread condemnation, including from president biden. the precarious state of new start has amplified concerns in washington and around the world about the future of arms control and the possibility of a destabilizing nuclear arms competition among the world's major powers and the risk of armed conflict escalating to the nuclear level. joining us today to address russia's new start suspension and prospects for arms control in the current environment is mallory stewart, who serves as assistant secretary of state for the bureau of arms control verification and compliance. she will be delivering keynote remarks from the podium, and following her presentation, there will be a discussion moderated by my colleague robert einhorn on the implications of russia's suspension of its participation in the new start treaty. let me briefly introduce our distinctive speakers.

assistant secretary stewar t joined the bureau in 2022 after serving as special assistant to president biden and senior director for arms control, and disarmament, and nonproliferation at the national security council since january 2021. she previously served as a senior manager at the center for global security and cooperation, as deputy assistant secretary in the abc bureau of the department of state, and asi an attorney at state office of legal advisor. assistant secretary stewart was the lead lawyer on the negotiations that led to the 2013 u.s.-russia framework for the elimination of syrian chemical weapons. bob einhorn is a senior fellow at the strobe talbott center for security, strategy, and technology at brookings foreign policy. during the obama administration, bob served as advisor for nonproliferation arms control at

the state department, a position that was specifically created by then-secretary of state hillary clinton. he served as assistant secretary of state for nonproliferation during the bow clinton administration, and help many other positions in government and academia working on nonproliferation issues. before i handed the mic to assistant secretary stewart, i would like to know that we are streaming live on the record. for those of you joining us virtually, some in your questions to events -- submit your questions to events @brookings.edu. we will have a q&a at the end of our event today and staff will come around with microphones for you to join the conversation. thank you, and the floor is now yours, assistant secretary. >> thank you to the brookings institution for having me here today. thank you all for being here.

as you know, we have just passed one year of russia's illegal and unconscionable continuing invasion of ukraine. last year we heard that president putin chose to hold the one remaining bilateral treaty between the united states and russia hostage to fulfill his expansionist goals. putin's decision is a mistake russia's announced suspension of new start will not enter the united states or its allies and partners from supporting ukraine. moscow's decision and its continuing nuclear threats will only be in first -- reinforce how important standing behind ukraine remains for the united states and the goebel community. president biden has made it clear that no matter what else is happening in the world, the united states is ready to pursue critical arms control measures. the president said this not just by the security threats that persist, but because of them. arms control isn't something

that you cast aside when tensions are on the rise. on the contrary, the value of arms control is greatest when conditions are rife for miscalculation and spiraling arms races. that is why russia's announcement last week that it is suspending its participation in new start is so troubling. we are watching carefully to see what russia actually does in the wake of president putin's announcement, and we are engaging with russian officials. to get a more detailed x clinician of their actions, most importantly we will make sure that under these new circumstances we remain postured to defend the united states and our allies. given the misinformation that continues to flow from moscow, it is important to highlight how we arrived at this point. when this administers and began, we and the russian federation extended new start for the full five years allowed under the agreement because both sides saw that it was clearly in the security interests of our respective countries. russian officials have affirmed their support for new start many

times, because like us, they understand that neither country is better off in a world where the two largest nuclear powers no longer engage in stabilizing forms of transparency. this only underscores what an unfortunate step putin's announced suspension is. his actions that not only the viability of new start, but the future of u.s.-russia arms control. furthermore, it promotes instability and it is more likely to drive countries to band closer together for the common defense. and it will not compel the united states to back down in its support for ukraine. in terms of how we got here, let me outline russia's noncompliance with new start, which began long before putin announced his intention to suspend the treaty. during the pandemic, the united states and russia mutually accepted a pause to new start inspections. in june 2022, that understanding

lapsed after it became clear that both parties could resume inspections while keeping our inspectors and inspected parties say. in august 2022, russia refused to comply with its obligation under new start to facilitate inspection activities on its territory, and russia has maintained that position since then. contrary to russian assertions, there is nothing preventing russian inspectors from traveling to the united states and conducting inspections. since the summer of 2022, we have made crystal clear to russia that we are prepared to honor our obligation to host russian inspectors. russian state aircraft have viable air routes to transport inspectors to the united states, and russian inspectors can also use commercial air travel to reach the united states territory under the treaty. we put significant time and effort into engaging russia, other countries, and private entities to ensure russia can fully exercise its inspection rights. just to make sure there is

absolutely no confusion on this point, there are no transit requirements, overflight restrictions, or financial or other sanctions that prevent russia from fully exercising its treaty rights. if russia has valid concerns about a specific russian facility subject to inspection activities, there are treaty positions that can be invoked. but russia's blanket denial of inspections at all russian facilities is not allowed under the tree. -- under the treaty. russia also did not comply with the new start treaty obligation to convene a session of the treaty limitation bodies -- and limitation bodies -- imp lementation bodies in accordance with the timeline. we did have a session set for late november. le we emphasizet that all issues russia identified for discussion were on our agenda. validation lists were exchanged and both sides were prepared to get on planes and travel to the meeting. unfortunately, moscow pulled the

plug on the meaning at the last minute and has not proposed another time. russia has continued to assert that it is the united states that is not in compliance with the treaty, and that is not true. the united states remains in full compliance with the new start treaty, including the treaty's numerical limits. russia has alleged concerns with respect to u.s. conversion of submarine-launched ballistic missiles, fobm lectures, and heavy bombers. new inspections allow for its rated items to confirm the results of conversion, and we have identified a confidence building measure to resolve russia's concerns regarding the conversions. we are prepared to implement that, but it does require russian inspection at a relevant u.s. facility, an available option that russia is currently choosing not to exercise. again, the u.s. has remained ready to host russian inspectors and u.s. facilities, specifically so that russia can verify the conversions, and we

have been ready to engage to discuss any implementation concerns russia has under the treaty. russia's noncompliance is problematic, and president putin's space pension -- suspension of the treaty is not in anyone's interest. the good news is these are readily fixable problems. should moscow choose to return to the benefits of transparency, stability, and nuclear risk reduction. beyond the provisions of the treaty, russia has now asserted that the security environment today is different than it was when new start was concluded. there is no arguing that point. the treaty was signed in 2010, prior to russia's unprovoked and unlawful invasion of ukraine in 2014 and its full-scale invasion of ukraine in 2022. it is russia that launched without provocation an invasion of its neighbor. far from fostering unfavorable conditions, the united states actively worked to avoid them, including by holding an

extraordinary session of u.s.-russian strategic stability dialogue in january 2022. the strong u.s.-international response to russia's unprovoked, full-scale invasion of ukraine does not absolve russia of its responsibility to fulfill its legal obligations under new start. and again, no russian actions related to new start will stop us from supporting ukraine. in his suspension announcement, putin invoked perceived nuclear threats from u.s. allies and raised the specter of nuclear testing. first, the nuclear arsenal of our allies existed in 2010 when we were negotiating new start and in 2021 when we extended the treaty. russia understood this, and nonetheless recognized utility of new start for a bilateral relation and global stability. second, on testing, no other nation except north korea is engaged in threats about nuclear testing. it seems the only reason putin brought up the matter was to inject more fear into our

pronouncement already intended to frighten. -- a pronouncement already intended to find. already the decision defies logic and reason. the united states will continue to aid ukraine in the face of russian efforts to subjugate it, but that reality does not affect the utility of new start or russia's ability to continue participation under the treaty. transparency and predictability around strategic nuclear forces is good for bilateral and global civility, period. putin was not so forced -- was not forced to suspend participation. it was his choice, and he should and can reverse it. the united states remains ready to work constructively with russia to fully clement new start -- fully implement a. we continue to view nuclear arms control is a way to strengthen u.s., ally, and global security. and we will continue and we encourage the international community to join us in emphasizing for moscow the risks that this irresponsible decision poses for russia.

certainly nuclear arms control promotes stability that is predicated on particularly and transparency. broader arms control measures can also help identify and address destabilizing activities. they can define responsible behavior so that the world more clearly recognizes irresponsible behavior to either avoid it or to hold accountable those responsible for it, and finally, by stabilizing the domains for transparency and accountability, arms control can prevent unnecessary and costly arms races and hopefully allow -- let me give you examples of what we were working on to stabilize the global geopolitical environment. i will start with the people's republic of china. the p.r.c.'s nuclear weapons buildup raises questions about its intents and policies and reinforces the importance of pursuing practical measures to reduce nuclear risks. additionally, the p.r.c. is developing and modernizing

conventional forces and counter space capabilities. while we continue to meeting our ability to defend against and deter a range of threats to ourselves, our allies, and partners, we also seek to engage the p.r.c. on risk reduction through improved crisis communication, information sharing, and measures of restraint, even more important during an intensified period of competition. and which is deeply in the p.r.c.'s interest as well, so they can avoid misunderstandings, miscalculations, and misperceptions, especially on a world built on false narratives. we are working with the international community to define what responsible be fear for -- responsible behavior is. outerspace, for example, is an essential domain driving prosperity and security for all states, whether in weather forecasting, position navigation and typing, -- timing, poor communications -- or

communications. one of the easiest and quickest ways to reduce threats to our astronauts and our space assets is to reduce the intentional creation of debris. that is why we worked with the united nations general is only to adopt a resolution calling on states to commit not to conduct instructive missile testing. despite the russian and chinese opposition, 155 states voted yes on this resolution. not only is this a demonstration of the international community's desire that such reckless acts never occur again, but it is the first of what we think will be many more norms of responsible behavior joint is a bait and address pressing threats in the space security. in january we submitted to the u.n. a proposal for new norms of responsible behavior which we look forward to discussing with the countries in the coming months. we see similar opportunities

when it comes to emerging technologies. artificial intelligence is a transformational general-purpose technology that has altered our ambitions in positive ways. from a national secure new perspective, however, we want to ensure that all countries develop and use ai in our militaries and responsible manner. absent a consensus in this area, states may rush to harness ai without a careful approach and could deploy systems with unpredictable consequences. as undersecretary bonnie jenkins said earlier this month when announcing the u.s. political declaration on responsible military use of artificial intelligence and autonomy, we have an obligation to create strong norms of its possible behavior concerning military use -- responsible behavior concerning military uses of ai in a way that keeps in mind that applications of ai by military will change in the coming years we believe that having states commit to these norms will help reduce risks while harnessing the benefits of such

technologies. we look forward to continuing to work with partners to develop what responsible use of ai in the military arena looks like for the global community. beyond ai, the bureau is looking at implications of technology like quantum computing, geo-engineering, and deep space for key element of our approach is being able to see and confirm and even demonstrate to the world what is happening regarding covert programs and technologies. we are constantly trying to improve our ability to collect, detect, deter, and verify. our work includes practical efforts such as the international partnership for nuclear disbarment and verification, ipndv, which increases awareness of verification issues critical to disarmament. the partnership focuses on practical hands-on activities like exercises and tactical demonstrations which

allow the partners to test in realistic scenarios procedures, techniques, and technologies we have developed over the last six years. similarly, creating an environment for nuclear disarmament provides a space in which members can have a frank and formal discussions that are integral to advancing the role of nuclear risk reduction, arms control, and disarmament. the new voices and partners we have heard from have been crucial to our understanding of different threat perception and confidence-building mechanisms and security challenges. in my position at the arms control bureau at the u.s. state department, i am very familiar with the refrain that now is not the time for arms control. the logic behind that refrain is understandable. i'm schedule requires partners, and -- arms control requires partners, and it is hard to think about cooperation when we are in the middle of one of the most significant challenges to european security since world war two. it is hard to think about how we sit down with russian officials while the government persists in

treating noncompliance and while there forces engage -- their forces engage in significant challenges to the civilian population, committing war crimes on a daily basis. it can seem like we should focus all our efforts on overcoming challenges to alliance and partnership community in the face of food, energy, and equipment shortages, directly resulting from russia's war against ukraine. but those thoughts ignore the reality, that if we cannot find ways to manage nuclear risks, that we must all -- we will all face the results and the dangers together. the united states, our allies and partners, as well as russia and all other nations must prevent this. this is exactly the time that we most need arms control. whether it is in the form of risk reduction, crisis communications, stabilization mechanisms such as confidence and security-building measures,

norm-building or legally binding agreements, history has shown that when the risk of miscalculation is at its height, that is when the arms control toolkit can be most essential. the united states will not sit back and on nuclear instability to metastasize. whether working to preserve new start to improve our defensive posture or to prepare the grounds of future arms control arrangements, we will continue to do when our president has asked us to do, lead efforts to safeguard this country in the world from nuclear threats. thank you, and i look forward to your questions. >> mallory, thank you very much

for joining us today. thank you for your very clear overview of the biden administration reaction to putin's suspension of russia's participation, in the outlook you see for arms control, risk reduction, going forward. i have some of my own questions for you. we have a large group of online viewers. several of them have already submitted questions. we weave their questions into our conversation, and then after we've spoken for a while, i think we will give our audience here in prison and the online audience additional opportunities-- in person in the online audience additional opportunities to pose questions to you. just a reminder, if our online audience wishes to pose questions, please send them to events@brookings.edu and to twee

t #newstartsuspension. you see the address up on your screen. let me start by saying, do we really have a clear idea of the activities that russia intends to suspend under putin's announcement? it is clear there is -- they are still not going to permit inspections on the territory. the russian foreign ministry issued a statement in which it said they will continue to advise -- abide by the quantitative limitations of new start. and they also said they will continue to provide notifications of lunches -- launches of submarine launched ballistic missiles and icbm's in accordance with the soviet-era

u.s.-soviet 1988 agreement. but to my knowledge, they haven't said anything about all of the notifications, the data exchanges, all of that, which gives us a much clearer understanding of russian strategic activities. you mentioned that we have approached the russians to try to get answers. have you gotten any clarification? what is your assessment of the activities that they are going to suspend? >> so, aside from the information that you just recounted, we haven't received any formal notifications with respect to the treaty that suspends additional notifications. we are following, as you are, what the russian government has said through its speeches and communications beyond the formal treaty notification process.

the suspension hasn't been officially effective yet, in the sense that we are still receiving notifications as regionally is today under the treaty. but as soon as the suspension has been formalized, those. pursuant to what we have heard from our russian -- those will stop presumed to what we have heard from our russian colleagues. right now we expect it will be launch notifications under the 1998 -- 1988 agreement, and they will abide by the actual numerical limitations. robert: whatever they are prepared to do, is the biden administration continue providing -- prepared to continue providing the new start-mandated notifications regardless of what the russians do? mallory: we are looking at the available options right now. i think it really will depend

how this suspension is affected, how it moves forward, what the reasons they actually formally provide for us come and what they end up providing in terms of information. i think we are not sure right now. it is very much an open question since we have not seen a formal notification, so we will need to figure out what we will be able to do once we understand what they are intending to do. robert: we have a question on this subject from an online audience member. it's david from the government accountability office. he asks whether russia's suspension perhaps of these notifications -- we don't know how extensive they will be -- but whether russia's suspension will reduce the ability of the united states to acquire critical information on affecting u.s. security. can the united states get what it needs through its own

national technical means, through open sources, through other methods of gathering information? of course, you don't know the extent of their suspension, but are we concerned that we are going to lose track regarding russian strategic activities? mallory: as we have been arguing to russia and as we made the case clearly when we discussed their noncompliance, inspections are crucial for both countries. and the bcc, which is set up to discuss implementation questions and complaints concerns, is crucial as well to be able to allow for the continuing functioning of the treaty. so those two elements that had already been not complied with by russia's behavior before the announced suspension of impacted our ability to implement the treaty and understand what is going on on the ground. depending on what they end up providing in terms of notifications under the

suspension, for the diminishment of information from -- further diminishment of information from a transparency structure that the treaty provides for will not be helpful to the stability and security of either side, and that is really what we are trying to understand here. it isn't the russian interest -- it is in russian interest as well to received information from us just as it it is in our interest to receive the information from them. robert: you mentioned that the state department issued a finding a couple weeks ago that russia was not complying with some important new start obligations, in particular to allow to facilitate inspections on their territory, to meet in the new start implementation body, the bcc. but in response to the state department's charges, the russians have, back and said that the united states is -- come back and said that the

united states is in material breach of its new start obligations. you mentioned russian concerns about its ability to come to the united states inspection. you also mentioned concerns about conversion. which is this very serious accusation, because conversion done right ensures that a country abides by its quantitative limitations. essentially the russians are raising the question of whether the united states is abiding by the treaty's limits. can you explain a little bit the conversion issue? what are they concerned about? what american citizens mallory: the slb and long terms and heavy bombers traded they are concerned we have not allowed them to be included under the new start limitations. they want to ensure the heavy

bombers cannot carry, nuclear weapons and limitations. we have worked out transparency and competency measure with the russians that only needs an inspection of the mantra to allow them to confirm it addresses their concern. they are alleging that we are breaching a treaty but they are not allowing us to show them how we are not breaching the treaty. the inspection provisions are specifically set up to address these kinds of questions. we have worked out a tc bm with them. they are not taking advantage of the inspection right. we are encouraging them to do that to confirm we can demonstrate these conversions. it is sufficient and establishes our equipment cannot be used for purposes from using them. there is a path forward. they should take advantage of

inspections and allow their inspectors to confirm these conversions are sufficient. without inspections, we cannot establish continuing operations in the manner they are suggesting we need to. it is a catch 22 that they are accusing us of being in violation but they are not taking advantage -- they're not allowing us to take advantage to confirm we are doing the right things. robert: you mentioned nuclear testing. putin said that russia could resume nuclear testing if the united states resumed nuclear testing. this kind of came out of the blue. no one in the u.s. government is talking about resuming nuclear testing. why did putin raise this issue? was it simply political, more nuclear scaremongering, or some

indication that russia itself is considering the resumption of nuclear testing? how is this red in the u.s. government? mallory: we didn't understand where it came from. we kicked around all of the ideas you mentioned. we set a consensus that the extent to the suspension announcement was destabilizing and intended to cause some degree of fear. maybe adding in nuclear testing would lend strength to president putin's efforts to destabilize and grow concerns in the international community about this decision. robert: the russians have said in a number of ways that the new start suspension is reversible. on the other hand they say as long as the united states and the west seek russia's strategic

defeat, there cannot be a return to business as usual. in light of this, what are the prospects for engaging with russia now? whether it is resuming the strategic stability dialogue that was suspended because of russia's invasion with ukraine, whether it is rescheduling the bcc meeting that the russians abruptly canceled at the last minute, or whether it is beginning negotiations on a follow-on agreement which expires in february 2026? in that connection we also have a question online. this one comes from ed levine of the center for arms control and nonproliferation. ed believes that the russian suspension was not nearly as

extensive as it could have been. he asks whether this suggests russia still understands the need for arms control. i will add it to ed's question, the russian foreign ministry stated that new start contribution to strengthening international security and strategic stability has not been exhausted. what does all of this mean for prospects of negotiations on new start? are the russians still interested in arms control? mallory: we very much hope so. in their domestic industries -- in their domestic interests and our global interest. we have obligations under our commitments to find ways to reduce nuclear risk and stabilize the global environment.

we have said, what president putin has reminded the community is that the u.s. government is willing to meet our arms control with russia. president biden has said it. secretary blinken just said it last week. we will meet with them. we needed to meet with them. it is something both countries need to do to continue to focus on international stability. the context in which we meet them is up to, a certain degree available mechanisms. russia is not allowing the bcc to continue, is there another context in which we can meet in a group space context to have these conversations? that is what is so troubling. the communications we have heard from putin placed in doubt assumptions we have always had that they do value arms control and they have demonstrated this

value for decades. by tying it to ukraine right now, tying it to an immovable object in the sense that our support for ukraine at will not be limited by their new start decision, they are placing in doubt their support of the treaty itself. trying to figure out how we come to the table and talk about next steps in arms control and what we need to talk about right now with respect to new start it's challenging. but we are willing to do it. we made to have good faith partners to join us. through our president, the secretary of state, through secretary jenkins, today we have said we are willing to meet on this, we just need to understand where these communications are coming from. what the intent behind the communications that putin has most recently put out our. and how we address our obligations moving forward to

reduce nuclear risk. yes, we are ready. we just need to understand what context we will be able to meet with them. as the president said, we require a good faith partners to figure out how we push forward in this arena. robert: let's say the russians do agree to sit down and talk to us and they consider replacing new start with an arrangement. has the biden administration already decided what its objectives are for a follow-on agreement? the trump administration had talked about one limit regarding all nuclear weapons, deployed, nondeployed, strategic, nonstrategic and so forth. the u.s. congress and ratifying new start expressed its strong desire that a follow-on -- a follow-on agreement deal with

nonstrategic systems where russia has a large advantage. the biden administration, i said on the rescued -- on the record, but there has been discussion about having an aggregate of all nuclear weapons. could you give us a sense? has the biden administration adopted an approach, framework for pursuing a follow-on agreement and could you share some of its elements with us? mallory: we should be clear in discussion with follow-on new start requires compliance with new start. that is the point we have been trying to make this week, last week and all of january when we were discussing russian noncompliance. continuing since they failed to allow inspections and failed to engage in the bcc. we need to implement new start to be able to figure out how to push beyond new start.

we have been talking about trying to more comprehensively address the strategic stockpile including their large amount of tactical nuclear weapons. we are taking into account the existing challenges in the global community. we are looking at this through the integrated deterrence approach that our department has been discussing. we are not looking at this as a vacuum. we need compliance with new start first. that is the struggle right now. how do we bring russia back into compliance? and how they truly understand why it is in their interest to comply. for we get ahead of ourselves, that is the question we are trying to address right now. robert: let's assume we can get over that hurdle. you mentioned you seem to be saying the administration has looked at this idea of trying to

limit all nuclear weapons. that poses new challenges, especially verification. simply verifying the russians have limited their nonstrategic weapons also involves significant challenges. how far are we in our partners internationally, multilateral consideration of these issues? ? how far have would -- how far have we been able to get a handle of these issues? is there some way of segregating those issues and dealing with them in some fashion and dealing with them more verifiable element separately? mallory: this doesn't have to all be done in one swoop. you are right to point out the verification challenges that all

of these issues will represent. especially in an environment in which we are walking away from traditional instruments of arms control and traditional verification architecture. through a lot of our multilateral efforts, the sea in -- the ce nd, with the thoughts to understand what the concerns are, capacities are, where technologies could be developed, what we continue to hear from the partners, but also new voices to explain what their concerns are, we try to take it all in. we are not looking at one tool or another tool. we are trying to consider everything available to us in restraining strategic capacities we are dealing with. we should also figure out what is happening in the broader community. looking to the poc. looking to our p5 meetings to understand what can be done in

that context. looking across the border to address the challenging issues. robert: i have another online question. this one from john of global zero. john is a former senior director at the nfc for arms control which is the job you had before becoming a state department assistant secretary. john notes that president reagan declared the united states would abide by the limits of the un-ratified. two treaties as long as moscow did the same. john asked, with the consider something like the reagan approach? abiding by new start, as long as russia did the same? mallory: what i have been trying to say, nothing is necessarily off the table. we do need to understand russian

intent. we need to understand what they are willing to do. we have been reaching out to try to hear from them further to understand their position. there is flexibility how we can approach some of these issues as long as we are confident they can be approached in a viable manner and confident in our national security interest. as long as we can hear from russia what they would be interested in engaging in, but to even get to that point we need to have compliance with new start and understand new start is not bilateral in the global security interest. working through new start to next steps is the path we think the most productive to reestablish the functioning process of the last remaining nuclear arms control treaty between us. robert: even if russia had not invaded ukraine, even if russia

and, u.s. relations had not deteriorated, there will be all kinds of complications. u.s. and russian positions differ in a number of pointed -- a number of important respects. the treatment of missile defense on russian concerns about american precision guided long-range conventional missiles and so forth. could you focus on some of those complications and what the u.s. attitude would be in dealing with them? mallory: it was going to be a heart negotiation anyway for sure. everyone recognizes that. it is made even more difficult now. there is a fundamental understanding that it is in our

collective interest to engage in these discussions. with respect to the russians focus on u.s. missile defense or a strike and our focus on russia's large stockpile of tactical rep -- tactical weapons, there are differences for us to talk about and focus on. that said, we don't have to be limited to one instrument or another. we don't have to be looking at this through a pure legally binding if there is stuff to do in the nonbinding context. these are heart discussions. but we should figure out how we should implement new start and how we move from new start to the broader conversation. establishing some degree to implement the treaty that reconfirmed in 2021 and extended for five years, by russia, understanding from them why

their invasion on ukraine has so drastically changed the situation. it doesn't make sense to us when they have been confirming its importance and their diplomats have been saying how new start is valuable. we need to understand where they are coming from, what they're looking for and what is in our own natural -- our own national interests. robert: another question coming in online is from peter mist of the massachusetts peace action nuclear disarmament working group. peter metts asks whether it is time to start a new to eliminate all nuclear weapons? i would add, or is obama's vision of a world without nuclear weapons dead? or at least pushed to an even more distant aspirational future? mallory: one of the biggest challenges we have right now is

if one question -- if one country with nuclear weapons is pushing towards global zero and no other country with nuclear weapons takes the same approach, it is not a very realistic outlook. it is not stabilizing. we need to figure out how to move towards stabilizing in a coherent way versus an all or nothing approach. what we see from russia right now when they are claiming that our assertion of the need to have a strategic defeat of russia and ukraine somehow changes the environment for arms control is not credible. it is an excuse that is challenging. especially where secretary blinken said if russia stops fighting ukraine, they can go home and live their lives as usual, as normal and everything would proceed at pace. but if ukraine stopped fighting,

ukraine would cease to exist. it is a very different situation. you have one country threatening another country's very existence. that is the reason they cannot engage in arms control. it challenges our ability to move forward with them credibly. we need to understand and they need to understand the broader arm structure and across-the-board in their own interests stabilizes their own security, as well as the global community. that is the overarching problem. you cannot say this is the reason we need to get rid of all weapons. you will never hear anyone in russia or elsewhere, or china saying that is what they want to do right now. it is not credible to say that if the path forward at this very moment. robert: many experts believe the likelihood that nuclear weapons

will be used now, either intentionally or as a result of mist calculation, misperception, the likelihood has substantially increased in recent years. should a traditional arms control, meaning limiting the numbers and capabilities of nuclear forces, should that take a backseat to reducing the risks of nuclear war? and if we should be giving priority to risk reduction measures, what are some of the risk reduction measures we have in mind? you mentioned transparency is one, confidence building. do we have in mind some specific confidence building and transparency steps that we would put to the russians and perhaps the chinese and others as well? mallory: when i think of arms control, i think broadly of risk reduction.

when you mentioned -- i think of the treaty structures that have been around for many years. we should look across-the-board for what can be helpful right now. and the outerspace arena, we have been working on norms development. this as we have been doing in eye and military. even if russia is not participating, what helps lay the groundwork for understanding what other countries are doing, preventing miscommunication and miscalculation. when we see this increasing environment of potential destabilization, by losing these arms control instruments is where we need to look more broadly at stabilizing activities. norms development, transparency and confidence building measures, understanding what behavior is in these zones so we can clarify where bad behavior is occurring. we have seen this kind of effort

be effective. taking about the efforts the united states took to highlight the testing that the chinese government did in 2007. were enough to change your behavior so the same did not create as much debris. the debris from the 2007 test will continue to be around for decades to come. trying to stabilize the environment prevents the heightened tension and the miscommunication that exists, even with russia not a part of that normative framework, will help clarify the behavior that is existing. risk reduction, a of arms-control, but probably across the strategic domain including space, ai, technologies that implicate our strategic cap -- our strategic capacities and with behavior as we discuss. there is a large amount of

responsive behavior that nuclear stage can follow. we hope that everyone will follow that. robert: is the era of former legally binding arms-control agreements early -- agreements over? are we now into an era of normative arms-control? you mentioned the space, cyber, ai. these are issues where rapidly changing technologies, problems of definition make it difficult to formulate traditional kinds of arms-control measures. are we into a new era now? are these things of the past now? mallory: i hope not. we should still support them.

they all remain crucially important and will continue to be important. we should do the normative exercises. they could be helpful in the finding what leads to. the normative work and emerging disruptive, you can find what will be embodied in legally binding treaty when everyone comes to a common understanding and agreement to what that terminology means. we saw the evolution of arms-control perceived that way. with respect to the outerspace treaty, there was u.n. work that late the normative underpinnings for our agreement and why it is not a good idea to take weapons of mass destruction in orbit or celestial bodies. maybe it is because i have to

stay positive, i refuse to say the time of legally binding arms-control structures is done. we cannot predict the future but we should certainly work towards establishing the ability to enter into those to our u.s. national security interests and to the global security interest. robert: in your introductory remarks, you mentioned the rapidly growing chinese nuclear threat. my understanding is that the biden administration has reached out multiple times to china and thought to engage in some kind of discussions, strategic the -- strategic stability dialogue, that is with the biden administration began to do with russia. but these efforts to reach out to the chinese have been rebuffed every time. what is the plan for engaging

with china? china is a permanent member of the security council, it is a party to the non-from -- nonproliferation treaty. so how does the united states get china to the table. if the united states could get china to the table, what would be on the u.s. agenda? mallory: we have to work with china so that both of us understands it is in our mutual interests to engage in and china understands they can prevent these. with all the misunderstandings about what was happening in our near space atmosphere, it would have been helpful to have more lines of communication set up to be able to reach out very quickly. these are the kind of moments

you try to emphasize that communication is helpful. preventing this calculate -- preventing ms. h and is something in their own interest. one very positive interaction i was able to proceed in with the chinese government, under the obama administration was space security dialogue. restarting these dialogues to understand mutual threat perception, understanding what is happening in the space security arena and collective challenges for all of us. these are in china's interest as well as our own. having additional channels of medication between our military, as we had historically been trying to work on potential launch notifications to prevent ms. communication. which i know china has with other countries. these are options that are very much in chinese interest -- in

china's interest. we would be working to understand what the realm of the possibility is in terms of engagement and getting them to appreciate this is something we are working on right now. it cannot be underestimated that the domestic benefits of having risk reduction in place, arms-control and risk reduction and confidence building measures cannot be overstated. we have to work the little challenges that all countries right now, many countries are struggling with. because of this is number that arms-control is not -- this misnomer that arms-control is not in domestic interest. robert: we are going to have two competitive nuclear peers, russia and china. there are experts who say in such a world, new start would be

too constraining. that in order to deter both china and russia, the united states would have to build nuclear forces that exceed the limitations of new start. could you share with us administration thinking about how we are going to deal with two pure nuclear competitors. and can we manage to deter them by maintaining new start kinds of levels or even lower levels? has the china factor really said, no more reductions? we cannot afford to do that anymore. and still have high-quality deterrence? mallory: as our national security strategy said, we are aware of approaching this time in which we have two pure competitors in the strategic arena. it is something we are very much thinking about.

considerations going across the board. it is very active in the approach to determine how we are able to descend and deter aggression against ourselves and our allies and partners. an active conversation you can expect going on. what we need to get our heads around is how we maintain the existing structures. how we bring new start back. and how we ensure russia is feeding the narrative. it doesn't make sense to me to say because we are concerned about additional threats beyond russia, we should not stay in stabilizing and security enhancing treaty with russia. trying to figure out how to make sure we maintain new start but also address additional challenges is actively being discussed.

i can defer to many others involved in strategies. i have seen all kinds -- all sorts of considerations and all sorts of defensive opacities being discussed and making sure we are able to continue to defend ourselves is at the top. robert: arms-control has always been controversial, politically in the united states. but despite all the controversy, both republican and credit administrations have managed to gain approval for legally blinding arms-control treaties. but is that still possible in today's hyper-partisan political climate, in the united states? what are the implications of hyper-partisanship for the future of arms-control? mallory: it is a challenge.

we have seen that the erosion of a knowledge about how important arms-control is to domestic security. and the political arena has suggested somehow that negotiations in arms-control are somehow more beneficial to our partners in those negotiations than they are to ourselves. that reflects political narratives that is accurate. what we have seen is that walking away from arms-control structure, including in the jcpoa have not been to our advantage. we needed to ensure on a bipartisan basis, it is understood why these need to continue and we need to work to establish more stability through risk reduction. we will continue to work on that , regardless of the political environment.

the challenges we face from strategic stability and nuclear risk are not a four year, or even eight year challenge. wrecking everyone appreciate these are beyond the u.s. political cycle, is an important message for everyone to convey. it is challenging and we should all work on it. we have heard from our partners that they very much want to work on it. we needed to continue through this path. i am fascinated by the arms-control is dead concept. it doesn't die, it is a tool. it is a stabilizing mechanism. it needs to be available and it needs to continue to operate as a functioning and even as a possible mechanism that helps moving forward. you shouldn't say it, from now we can jump into a treaty.

both perspectives are not reality. that is what we are working on with our partners and more broadly. robert: we have about 15 minutes left. we have some time for questions from the audience. more questions online. please, when i call on you, state your name, tell us your affiliation and pose a short question. we start with you. >> great, thanks so much. hi, mallory, thank you for being here today. the last time we were was russia in treaty, the u.s. withdrew pool -- the u.s. withdrew. is very similar near -- is very similar narrative president biden is thinking of withdrawing?

and with new start, norms and notifications leading to a treaty or is a legally binding treaty not on the horizon? thanks. mallory: thank you, amy. with respect to the model, there was ape followed in that context that led to the demise of the treaty. in this context we are hoping to encourage russia to return to compliance. we are very much hoping that the international community helps us make this message that new start is in all of our interests. applications on the u.s. and russia to proceed in any stabilizing conversation. i cannot at this point say there is a necessary path forward. the options on the table.

it is hard to say the path forward. we are encouraging russia to engage with us in conversations about these issues. your second question, i would say, we need more information. that is what we are in the process of doing right now. gathering information about domestic requirements for notifications but also international requirements. understanding what is happening in the near space domain, across-the-board, so we are taking steps, who is notifying home. in the weather forecasting arena, this capacity is realized frequently. but also as we have seen, intel

gathering has been happening by china and others. we need to understand what is happening internationally before we lock in, even a normative approach, so that we can do so in a way that incorporates general practice and the information that is already out there. >> the arms-control association, thanks, mallory. the day after the russian suspense announcement, the foreign ministry made a statement that said new start is an important treaty for disarmament. china encourage the two sides to resolve their differences and ensure the treaty found -- what is your analysis of china's reasoning behind making a clear and strong statement in support of new start and the timing?

what is the state department or the administration doing to share its message about the back-and-forth about russia's misinformation about why they withdrew and why it is important to return to the negotiating table? mallory: i can only assume china's intent. they see the importance of new start to global stability. it has been mentioned multiple times. it has been discussed in the p5 as a by party -- a bilateral party infantry. that presumably is why the chinese government supports it and hope that comes back into force. it is in force but hope that russia comes back to compliance. i thought the chinese comments were helpful and ultimately i hope russia is listening to both china and the international community to see the suspension

of destabilizing. with respect to sharing communications, historically new start communications has been in the classified context. that was overlooked when some communications about the bcc and the inspections were made public during the time that that happened. primarily by the russian government. but then we responded. we are trying to correct the record when it becomes public. we are trying to engage with russia behind the scenes to understand what they're thinking on this is and what it means. we will be public with this communication when we need to correct the record, as we felt we needed to today. as secretary blinken and president biden have discussed, new start specifically in the last week, we are trying to understand from russia directly without going through a very public channel unless we have to

correct the record. robert: you mentioned just now the p5 forum. the five permanent members of the security council who are also the legitimate nuclear weapon states under the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, they have met regularly to talk about mpt issues in preparation for nonproliferation treaty. their agenda has mostly been about mpt issues. also it has gotten into issues about nuclear doctrine. when it has been sort of difficult to organize bilateral discussions, especially with the chinese, is this a forum of biden permitted members providing opportunity to engage multilaterally or on the sidelines to engage bilaterally?

is this something the biden administration is pursuing? mallory: absolutely. p5 level discussion has been important to share policies. to share nuclear doctrine. to address rick perception to understand how the p5 countries are looking at this issue. it has been enforced actively. a stabilizing opportunity as a risk reduction context in which we can engage with all five countries to be clear on elements where they could be misunderstanding. we hope it will continue. we have found it very beneficial. also an important fulfillment of an obligation that we have two work towards reducing real risk in the mpt context.

it is very positive. even in this concept of russia noncompliance with new start, these kind of p5 conversations have to continue. robert: gentlemen in the back? >> thank you very much. i am from a japanese newspaper. the question is about -- waiting to raise nuclear arms control, other key issue. in the united states, how do you expect how japanese leadership can convey a global message to the world?

mallory: we are working very closely with our g7 partners and with the japanese government on taking advantage of the location of the g-7 and the advantage of the japanese government strong leadership on arms-control, nonproliferation risk reduction and truly understanding the dangers of nuclear risk. it is a good opportunity to raise awareness globally. the personal and political experience. it is a good unification moment in which we can all appreciate why we need to work towards reducing the risk. i am looking forward to continuing positive communication from that group. but also to see how we can get

further in this responsible behavior. robert: we only have about five minutes left. why don't we take the remaining questions here, we have three more. mallory, take them and you can answer those questions and summit up. >> two questions, one, in putin, human reflected -- he talked about surveys where they have watched attacks. the first question is, how can we -- the ukraine attack, what is going on from a verification team -- verification regime?

the second, the treaty having been terminated, increasing specificity of that, increasing verification, any thoughts about the prospect for solidifying and making more specific the regime on inf, intermediate range missiles in europe? >> i am with regional broadcasting. we have seen periodic communications out of the kremlin, political figures, most notably deputy chairman of the russian counsel with nuclear arms. what they could do with it and what they have. how do you tie those statements

into control in general and specifically to their extension on this? do you take them seriously? robert: the gentleman back there. >> hello. i am mike from munich, germany. i have got a question regarding the munich security conference. the message is clear and the west stands together i am always wondering, how much happens behind the soon -- happens behind the scenes and is not published today mallory: i'm

going to make sure i answer all these questions. starting with the last one, a lot is happening behind-the-scenes. the munich security conference, the quickest way to talk to so many countries on a bilateral basis, on the sidelines, and to really have communication more directly by all being there. it is usually positive even if much of the positive progress made in that context isn't public or doesn't get reflected in a tangible document or a tangible commitment. the benefit of everyone meeting and having a huge like-minded presence in trying to work against the destabilizing environment that russia's invasion has continued, it is a positive opportunity for continuing to make sure like-minded are on the same page

. it is a huge advantage. jumping over to the instructions context and continuing from there, the information that could be utilized is not being tied to -- the idea inspections provide more information than is available just from watching the news, understanding what russia is doing in ukraine, it is not that credible. we understand prudent has expressed concern about more information sharing through the inspections and otherwise would be the case without inspections. verification of the treaty,

which is what we have been trying to say all along. if you have concerns about compliance, it seems like a good excuse for him to provide that inspections will potentially give more information that could help the ukrainians, but it is not credible. it is related to verifying new start. it would help them to verify their concerns about conversion activity. if both countries continue thi., with respect to imf, we need to have the conversation. the dialogues we have with russia until they invaded ukraine again. very important conversations to continue.

to start talking about new mechanisms with them, in light of that most recent development. robert: nuclear stable rattling. mallory: we have and watching closely their nuclear posture has not changed. nor have we seen a reason to change hours. it is something that does the range of politically motivated in many parts. but also continuing the destabilization efforts of the international community. trying to argue to those partner nations that are working to support ukraine, that they shouldn't support ukraine.

to -- we are watching their nuclear posture closely. it hasn't changed. the most recent communication i have heard from the department of defense, it is destabilizing to continue this type of behavior. most countries, did as such. and russia's interest to try to prevent community of like-minded nations, and pushing back on their aggression. it is extraordinarily unhelpful trying to push against it. robert: mallory, thanks so much for joining us. it is difficult to expose yourself, especially on the record, so soon after a development like putin's announcement. when the situation has not

entirely clarified. but you have done a terrific job. you have covered a lot of ground and you have helped us understand where we are not only in the wake of the announcement but also administration thinking on arms-control and risk reduction going forward. we are in debt to you. we also appreciate very much those who joined us here at brookings institution and the very large audience that viewed this session online. let's join in thanking assistant secretary mallory stewart for being here today. [applause] >> on tuesday former national security advisor mcmaster and

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